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Rousseau’s Crusoe myth: the unlikely provenance of the
neoclassical homo economicus
Matthew Watson
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
The neoclassical homo economicus has escaped the narrow confines of
economic theory and is today embodied countless times over in the
everyday behaviour that so much of the modern economy is set up
precisely to serve. Not all of the authors of leading books on economic
principles have named the neoclassical homo economicus, but when
they have done so it is overwhelmingly in the same way. They have
given him the human form of a Robinson Crusoe figure, despite the fact
that his behavioural motivations and his practical conduct owe next-to-
nothing to Daniel Defoe’s original characterisation. I suggest that the
route to today’s cultural familiarity with the neoclassical homo
economicus instead passes through the entirely unwitting hands of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He substituted Defoe’s account of the
castaway’s continuing deference to prevailing social norms with his own
idealised vision of how the individual might use solitude to escape the
corrupting influences of modern society. It is altogether another
desocialised individual also bearing the Crusoe name who has latterly
shaped many of the economics textbooks’ renderings of the neoclassical
homo economicus. However, we can get to him only by first
understanding the essential features of Rousseau’s Crusoe myth.
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Introduction
Homo economicus has become something of a cultural icon.1 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
for some time now he has walked amongst us, stalking our everyday decisions. This is because behav-
ioural interventions enacted through a variety of government policies today serve as encouragement
for more and more people to think and act like him. However, to suppress the alternative forms of
economic conduct that are always present as at least untapped potentials first requires learning what
it means to occupy the archetypal neoclassical agent’s economic mindset. In particular, it requires the
ability to call into the imagination the successes of somebody who already inhabits that way of being.
Given the widespread imprint that homo economicus has left behind, it is surely a great irony that
almost his only appearance as a named person in economics textbooks is not a real person at all. The
behavioural attributes of homo economicus are often taught through reference to Daniel Defoe’s fic-
tional character, Robinson Crusoe.
When homo economicus walks amongst us, then, he follows in the footsteps of a figure who has
been lifted out of an early eighteenth-century novel and placed within much later economic theories.
Yet this has only been possible because he was transformed out of all recognition in his move
between these two contexts. In itself, this move was patently not a single moment of transposition
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as much as something significantly more complex. It appears to have entailed a series of appeals to
previously partially transformed Crusoe figures, each of which differs substantively from its immedi-
ate predecessor, and each of which was created for a different reason specific to a particular author
working at a particular time and against the backdrop of a particular set of arguments. The relevant
historiographical back-story is certainly somewhat messy, then, but it is no less important for that.
If it is noteworthy enough that nobody other than a fictional character can be found to put some
‘real-life’ flesh on the bones of homo economicus, it is surely more noteworthy still that the original
fictional characterisation was itself deemed unfit for purpose. Appeals to some sort of Crusoe figure
spread far and wide amongst the first two generations of self-identifying marginalists who were
active from the 1870s onwards: Jevons, Menger, Edgeworth, Wicksteed, Böhm-Bawerk, von Wieser,
Marshall, Clark andWicksell all identified in him the ‘someone’ they needed to illustrate neoclassical
behavioural principles (White 1998, p. 217). Yet not one of them had a Crusoe whose conduct
resembled Defoe’s character in anything but its desert island location. When Carl Menger ([1871]
1950, p. 135) repeatedly called the hypothetical agent of his neoclassical theory ‘our Crusoe’, the
‘our’ in the description was unintentionally more revealing than the ‘Crusoe’. This character belongs
indisputably to the early neoclassical economists. It is their creation not Defoe’s, and the cultural
imprints left today by homo economicus owe much to them and not to him.
Defoe’s novel tells of how the castaway’s life provides the perfect context for Crusoe to learn the
early eighteenth-century bourgeois manners that he conspicuously failed to exhibit back at home as a
young man. In the hands of the early marginalists, however, that same context is the means of illus-
trating how the rational everyman who so entranced late nineteenth-century economic theorists
might be expected to act. This is quite some jump between two characters who consequently appear
to share little other than their name. In the final twist in the historiographical tale that underpins this
article I suggest that Crusoe’s transformation from reluctant early eighteenth-century English gentle-
man to the archetype for the late nineteenth-century homo economicus was facilitated, however
inadvertently, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings in Émile. I say ‘however inadvertently’ because
the whole of the rest of Rousseau’s intellectual oeuvre features conscious refusal of the sort of econ-
omic socialisation that homo economicus represents. Rousseau, I argue, had his own personal Cru-
soe myth, one which differs from that of neoclassical economics but nonetheless paved the way for it.
There remains an important disjuncture here, then, but the essential difference between the various
Crusoes should nonetheless prompt enquiries about how they are related. There is nothing in any of
Rousseau’s work that acts as a direct template for the neoclassical homo economicus. Yet my argu-
ment is in any case much less bold than that. It is merely that it is impossible to understand how the
neoclassical homo economicus might have been given the Crusoe name unless there is some appreci-
ation to start with of the role played by Rousseau in changing the way that Defoe’s novel was read
from the middle of the eighteenth century.
Rousseau embraced Defoe’s story because he thought he saw in Crusoe an Enlightenment anti-
hero, someone who rejected the excesses brought about by attending to social opinion so that he
might restrict his labour to catering only for natural needs (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 165). From
this perspective Crusoe displayed a dignity in labour that Rousseau believed could break the
bonds of having to work for a living and could therefore serve as the fulcrum of an alternative natural
education. There is indeed a narrative of conversion that runs through the novel, but it is not this one
(Hunter 1966, pp. 168–169). Rousseau’s reading of Defoe’s text emphasised the way in which salva-
tion might occur in his own social system rather than Defoe’s, and it does so only through selectively
reading into the story a series of implications that are absent from the original (Fishelov 2010,
p. 178). Despite Rousseau’s determination to present Crusoe as a role model for his young charge
Émile, Defoe’s hero is a most unlikely instantiation of Rousseauian aspirations. His change of priori-
ties results from increasingly explicit acknowledgment that he wishes to exhibit the characteristics of
bourgeois respectability in order to ease his return to the society from which his shipwreck tempor-
arily excludes him (Rogers 1979, p. 27). The fact that he adopts many attributes of Rousseauian asce-
ticism in the interim is purely down to force of circumstance rather than being affirmation of a new
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lifestyle choice. He does not reject the social construction of early eighteenth-century economic man
so much as try to become that man.
Rousseau disqualified this possibility by taking the return home out of the story. Moreover, he had
to, because Crusoe’s constant longing for a means of escaping the island and his delight in the
thought of his physical and emotional restoration to a society in which his claims on property
have meaning evidently contradict Rousseau’s preference for a natural education that permanent
abode on a desert island facilitates. The island setting for the original novel becomes meaningful
only insofar as it becomes a means of excluding competing claims on ownership (Schonhorn
1991, p. 149). For Rousseau, solitude enabled a conscious retreat from society, but the Defoe scholar
IanWatt (1951, p. 110) says that we should instead see Crusoe as having been ‘stranded in the utopia
of the Protestant Ethic’ that Defoe treated as the purification of his own society. Solitude, in this
regard, is not the reward for rejecting society so much as the punishment Crusoe receives for prior-
itising the intemperate pursuit of speculative riches over the bourgeois stability that Defoe treasured
so highly (p. 121).2 His restoration to society is conditional upon him learning how to become the
type of man his father had always wanted him to be and that he latterly sees he should always have
settled for being (p. 125).
In this form, though, the Crusoe figure would have been of no interest to the early marginalists.
They thought that the most important task of economic theory was to strip away all social influences
on behaviour so that the realm of the purely economic might be revealed. Rousseau’s depiction of
Crusoe as the manifestation of sustenance through hard work was easily turned into a morality
play about a desocialised back-to-nature survivalism (Green 1991, p. 150). It was this re-character-
isation that opened the door for the subsequent neoclassical depiction of Crusoe as the modern-day
homo economicus. Yet his final fleshing out nonetheless involved a circuitous route that took a
whole century and a half, by which time the connection back to Rousseau’s Crusoe myth went unre-
ferenced. My hope in the pages that follow is merely to draw attention to the need to think through
the separate steps that allow that connection to be made anew.
The analysis will now proceed in three stages in advance of such a claim. The first section reveals
the way in which Rousseau’s Crusoe myth results from a selective reading of the text governed by his
own prior analysis of fallen humanity that preceded the publication of Émile. It sidesteps almost
entirely Defoe’s description of the innermost thoughts that propel Crusoe’s activities when living
alone. Leopold Damrosch (1985, p. 197) accounts for the novel’s ability to fire the imagination of
the reader in terms of the tension it invokes between the island as a place of punishment and the
island as a paradise on earth. However, Defoe’s text concentrates solely on the former, and it is
only post-Rousseau and following his reflections on the delights of a purely natural education that
the idea of such a tension can be sustained. The second section contrasts Rousseau’s depiction of
the solitary state as a normative ideal with the psychological acts that Crusoe performs on himself
to escape the full implications of being deserted on the island. Solitary existence for Rousseau is a
mechanism for retreating from the social pressure to continually live in the opinion of others, but
Crusoe spends much time imagining himself living up to the economic expectations of his social
peers. The Crusoe figure that appears in Émile is therefore not Defoe’s in any simple sense, but
Defoe’s rewritten via the philosophical model of human existence Rousseau had already outlined
in his previous work. The third section focuses on the specific content of the individuals that Defoe’s
Crusoe summons in his imagination. He uses his time alone to experiment with imaginative devices
that allow him to visualise himself assuming positions of economic power within social hierarchies.
He continually calls to mind the image of subjects, and through this technique he becomes both fam-
iliar and comfortable with the idea of subjecting others economically in the search for social advance-
ment. In this way, Defoe’s Crusoe ultimately affirms Rousseau’s suspicions of status-driven economic
behaviour as already laid out in hisDiscourse on Inequality. The neoclassical homo economicus there-
fore has very curious historiographical foundations in Rousseau’s appropriation of a literary figure
that in its original formulation acts antithetically to his own philosophical wishes. Judged by the stan-
dards of Defoe’s novel, then, Rousseau must have invented a Crusoe myth if Émile was to learn from
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his actions. It is this, I argue, that subsequently propelled further Crusoe myths that eventually
resulted in him being named as the archetypal neoclassical homo economicus. Rousseau’s writings
in Émile remain only a starting point for this process, but they are important for precisely that reason.
Rousseau’s account of fallen humanity and the instruction of Émile
The usual way for specialist Defoe scholars to read Robinson Crusoe today is as an exercise in Pur-
itan spiritual autobiography (Starr 1976, p. 83). Crusoe himself opines that the reason for his ship-
wrecked state was his youthful decision to ‘tempt Providence to my ruine’ (p. 38) by the act
through which ‘I forsook my father’s house and broke thro’ all his good advice’ (pp. 55–56).
Despite his father’s passionate plea for him to defer to the prevailing structure of society he ignored
the move into a respectable bourgeois profession in preference for the much less assured rewards
of prospecting (p. 28). The novel’s narrative comes together only as Crusoe realises that physical
deliverance from the island first requires spiritual deliverance via atonement for his previous trans-
gressions of established social and economic norms (Hunter 1966, p. 188). Defoe must therefore be
understood to have infused his text with cautionary tales about the dangers of rebelling against the
social order of early eighteenth-century England: theological moralism was harnessed to political
conservatism (Idelson-Shein 2014, p. 160). His readers were encouraged to act passively in regard
to that order through the narrative trick of treating bourgeois respectability as the antidote to Cru-
soe’s ‘original sin’. Today’s dominant spiritual autobiography interpretation therefore organises
Defoe’s text around a clear cycle of fall and redemption. It associates Crusoe’s fall with the purpo-
seful denial of filial duty and his consequent punishment takes the form of exclusion from society.
True redemption is reserved solely for when providential judgement affirms the success of Cru-
soe’s self-tutored adoption of bourgeois norms and arranges the opportunity for him to secure
safe passage home.
Rousseau’s rather different presentation of Defoe’s story for his idealised pupil Émile’s instruction
involves a complete inversion of this particular cycle of fall and redemption. He treated the individ-
ual’s fall not as the moment at which exclusion from society takes place but as a necessary feature of
the equally necessary requirement of taking the first step within society and being exposed to its
deceptions. Redemption for Crusoe therefore cannot occur upon leaving the island for the return
home but must be restricted to the time on the island when he lacks human company. This changes
the content of the underlying idea of Robinson Crusoe as a success story. Defoe’s narrative only works
in its own terms because it draws the reader into assuming that Crusoe will have his one true desire
satisfied by eventually being delivered home. In this regard the shipwreck is a deus ex machina that
allows him to do his penance through solitary labour and thus earn his delivery (Billig 2014, p. 25).
Rousseau ([1762] 2003, p. 166), by contrast, instructed Émile to treat solitary labour, not as a means
to an ulterior end, but as an end in itself, especially insofar as it enabled him to feel closer to nature
through the work that he does on it.
‘Now, of all the occupations which can furnish subsistence to man’, wrote Rousseau ([1762] 2003,
p. 177), ‘that which approaches nearest to the state of Nature is manual labor’. He asked his young
charge to consider how Crusoe might free himself from the destabilising impact of social opinion and
experiment with approximations of his hypothetical ‘natural self’ through the labouring tasks that
Defoe’s Crusoe called the ‘strange multitude of little things’ that make life liveable (p. 130). Émile
is then encouraged to go one stage further and to think of himself as Crusoe, thus imagining the dis-
missive responses he would give to some of modern life’s peculiarities were he able to create in his
mind a perfect replica of Crusoe’s pre-social position, in which anything other than performing sub-
sistence tasks through manual labour becomes meaningless (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 168). Rous-
seau knew that Émile would ultimately have to reconcile himself to living within society, but he
wanted to give him as many vicarious experiences as possible first of living as a Crusoe-type figure
who could therefore take nature with him as he was eventually forced to enter society (McGrath
2010, p. 124).
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It is notable in this regard that Rousseau would not allow Émile to read any other than the parts of
Defoe’s text when Crusoe is alone on the island (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 165). This amounts to only
around 30% of the original novel’s overall contents. In Rousseau’s rather unflattering depiction it is
the story ‘divested of all its rubbish’ (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 163). The providential intimations
that frequently reappear to bind together Defoe’s narrative have almost no role in what is left for
Émile to study (Green 1991, p. 154). Defoe’s theological moralism, which is so prominent especially
in the early part of the story, thus gets replaced by Rousseau’s pedagogical moralism (Fuchs 2004,
p. 158). Rousseau would not sanction anything of a theological orientation that might help Émile
to identify with Crusoe’s efforts to reinvent himself as worthy of return to an explicitly bourgeois
society. Indeed, he warned against giving children any uncensored view of modern literature. It
bore the cultural imprints of a corrupted society, he said, by falsely attributing virtuous status to
the bourgeois politeness of early eighteenth-century economic man. ‘I hate books’, was his typically
forthright choice of words to illustrate the distance between the values he believed were depicted in
modern literature and the values enshrined in his own principles of natural education (Rousseau
[1762] 2003, p. 161).
The partial exception he was willing to make for Robinson Crusoe arose from reading into Defoe’s
novel the moral propriety he associated with solitude. To him, Crusoe was unique amongst literary
heroes in being located ‘in the place of an isolated man’, from where he could live a life ‘above preju-
dices’ (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 163). The main lesson for Émile to take from the story was the
capacity to use the solitary state to transcend the pressures of other people’s opinions: ‘This is
how we realize the desert island which first served me as a means of comparison’, he wrote (Rousseau
[1762] 2003, p. 163). In particular in Rousseau’s eyes, an isolated existence eliminated the individ-
ual’s dependence on the opinion of others when attempting to derive forms of social consciousness
that could carry information about perceived self-worth (Charvet 1974, p. 32). Put simply, the indi-
vidual could not be an economic status-seeker when living alone. The Crusoe of Defoe’s construction
is a seed merchant who goes to extraordinary lengths to improve the property he claims as the ship-
wreck’s sole survivor. The Crusoe of Rousseau’s construction is instead a botanist who revels in the
natural landscape into which fortune places him (Engélibert 1996, p. 274).
Throughout his early work, but never more so than in his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau
endeavoured to explain his preference for solitude by historicising the impact of social forms of exist-
ence on what he called the natural self. This distinctive concept is clearly nothing more than an
abstraction, an idealisation of how human life might have been lived before the first impulses forced
individuals for their own ease into communal habitation (Scott 1992, pp. 697–698). The concept of
the natural self was designed to fill in the blanks of historical knowledge as plausibly as possible, sub-
stituting for missing ethnographies of the past so as to rationally reconstruct the trajectory of human
evolution whose end-point is confirmed by ethnographies of the present (Rousseau [1754] 1993,
pp. 44–46). Rousseau’s use of this method enabled him to situate the natural self at the very inception
of consciousness, at the point at which self-awareness was first mutually constituted with the aware-
ness of differences exhibited by others (Kuhn 2006, p. 17). After that point, consciousness of the self
co-evolved with society’s prevailing structure of manners, becoming as it did so increasingly insepar-
able from the imagined expectations of one’s most immediate peer groups (Banerjee 1977, p. 172).
Crusoe cannot, of course, act as a guide for what human existence was like before consciousness,
because he must be a product of the society from which the shipwreck excludes him and into
which Émile must eventually pass. His interest to Rousseau lies in the temporary respite his island
setting makes possible from social opinion and the clues that this provides for how Émile might be
sheltered from the full corrupting effects of modern society by first having received an education
conducted according to the principles of nature (Harari 1987, p. 119).
The natural self encountered in the Discourse on Inequality is afforded normative status that is
elevated there way beyond anything that can be found in Émile. This is because it is in this condition
only that individuals can take on an unqualified ‘wholeness’ and are thus capable of surrendering
solely to themselves. Yet because it relates to a past to which there can be no return, the notion
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of an individual who is entirely self-contained and self-sustaining must remain an unrealisable ideal-
isation within the context of a natural education. Rousseau’s strictures on the latter are not an
instruction manual for creating a natural self, only a second-best that recognises how far out of
reach the natural self will always be. The contrast in both instances is to socialised forms of existence,
where ‘society offers to us only an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions’ (Rousseau
[1754] 1993, p. 115). It is unclear whether Émile will ever be able to avoid a future surrounded by
such corruptions, but learning to be himself through a natural education provides the most assured
means of mitigating their worst excesses (Vanpée 1990, p. 46). The natural self is able to live as a
perfectly self-oriented individual because the opinion of others has no bearing on decisions about
how to act. Such decisions are propelled by the survival functions that the actions satisfy rather
than by the social effects of having the actions acknowledged (Rousseau [1754] 1993, p. 71). Rous-
seau drew the distinction to socialised existence in the following way: ‘social man lives constantly
outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others’ (Rousseau [1754] 1993,
p. 116). With each person continually updating what they believe they know about themselves on
account of other people’s understanding of where the boundaries of social acceptability are posi-
tioned, everyone becomes an imperfect mirror for everyone else to make assessments about their
own subjectivity. Consciousness of the self consequently becomes a constant struggle for self-
location with respect to a moving target that is the very opposite of personal self-containment (Rous-
seau [1754] 1993, p. 102). Rousseau’s account of fallen humanity centred decisively on this distinc-
tion between what people have become within society and what they might otherwise have remained
in an ideal realm where the natural self flourished beyond society. The principles of natural edu-
cation accept that human history cannot simply be reversed to a time before consciousness prevailed,
but they do commit to making the most of what results.
Nowhere were Rousseau’s principles of natural education put into practice more extensively in
the late eighteenth century than in Germany. The most prominent pioneer was Johann Bernhard
Basedow, whose progressive school in Dessau, the Philanthropinum, was opened in 1774. This
was six years after publishing his educational tract, Vorstellung an Menschenfreunde und vermögende
Männer über Schulen und Studien,3 which itself was published six years after Rousseau wrote Émile
as his own manifesto for a natural education (Baggerman & Dekker 2009, p. 56). The objective of the
Philanthropinum was to nurture self-activity on the part of the child by departing from the existing
tradition of rote learning within a religious framework. Up until then, this had figured almost exclu-
sively as the educational backdrop through which European societies had tried to instantiate the next
generation of bourgeois subjects (Louden 2011, p. 143). Instead, and in line with Rousseau’s con-
struction of Crusoe – but, importantly, not Defoe’s – Basedow emphasised the love of manual
work as a means of dignifying labour and the love of tending the land as a means of respecting nature
for itself (Sharma 2007, p. 76). This led to an ordered curriculum that has to be contrasted to the
complete laisse-moi faire approach that Rousseau envisioned for Émile. Yet it still amounted to a
revolutionary embrace, for its time, of the concept of learning readiness, through which the teacher
was to use play as a mechanism for detecting the point at which each pupil was deemed able to move
to the next stage of their learning (Bowen 1981, p. 200). Crusoe’s desert island location, which Rous-
seau had advocated as the primary setting for the games through which Émile would voluntarily
begin to appreciate nature, was never far away in this regard.
One of Basedow’s successors at the Philanthropinum, Joachim Heinrich Campe, took this reifica-
tion of the lone desert island inhabitant to further extremes. He systematically reframed the political
centrepoint of Defoe’s original novel in his imitation, Robinson der Jüngere.4 He used his Preface to
say that his Crusoe would be an even better role model for his Emilius than Rousseau’s Crusoe was
for his Émile (Campe 1788, pp. 13–14). ‘Mr. Rousseau is mistaken’, wrote Campe (1788, p. 12).
The Old Robinson Crusoe [that Rousseau had allowed Defoe to set the terms for] has plenty of tools and instru-
ments, which he saves from the wreck of a ship; whereas the New Robinson Crusoe [that Campe created specifi-
cally for an audience of children] has nothing but his head and his hands to depend on for his preservation.
(emphasis in the original)
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Campe overplayed his hand in this regard, because Rousseau’s very ﬁrst mention of Crusoe in Émile
shows that what he had in mind is less Campe’s ‘old’ Crusoe than his ‘new’. The image to be pre-
sented to his young charge, he wrote, was of ‘Robinson Crusoe on his island, alone, deprived of
the assistance of his fellows and of the instruments of all the arts’ (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 163).
Rousseau’s Crusoe is a direct forerunner of Campe’s in starting his solitary existence without the
beneﬁts of ﬁrst salvaging a stock of tools from the shipwreck. Émile is to imagine himself as a Crusoe
without the tools of the society from which he has been excluded, because this will help Rousseau to
prepare him for his preferred entry into society: ‘if he himself is at work, at each tool that he is using
he will not fail to say to himself: “If I did not have this tool, how should I go to work to make one like
it or to do without it?”’ (Rousseau [1762] 2003, p. 169). Campe’s Crusoe is therefore no more of a
Rousseauian idealisation than Rousseau’s own. This is probably only as is to be expected, because the
world that Campe created for his real-life Emiliuses at the Philanthropinum was evidently much less
rough-and-tumble than the purely natural surroundings in which Rousseau would happily have had
Émile immerse himself. It was a sanitised point somewhere between nature and society (Baggerman
and Dekker 2009, p. 134).
All of this might still seem to be something of a leap to the neoclassical homo economicus. As
Michael White (1982, p. 34) demonstrated in an authoritative early account of how the neoclassical
Crusoe came to economics, even though it was unbeknownst to what are usually still seen as the first-
generation marginalists of the 1870s, they had been beaten to the punch by Hermann Heinrich Gos-
sen when it came both to redefining the economic concept of value in marginalist terms and to using
a Crusoe figure to exemplify that conception. When Gossen ([1854] 1983, p. 54) insisted that ‘the
results presented [for his theory of value] conform exactly to the experiences provided by actuality’,
he gave the following justification:
In order to become fully convinced of this, one needs only to read Campe’s tale for the young, Robinson Crusoe,
up to the point when Crusoe finds Friday. One will then approve of Robinson’s actions exactly insofar as they
are in accord with our earlier pronouncements.
The important fact here is that the historiographical route from Defoe’s original novel to the neo-
classical Crusoe passes directly through Campe’s reworking and, to his mind at least, perfecting
of Rousseau’s Crusoe ﬁgure. Gossen really could not have been any more explicit that this was
the source for how homo economicus might latterly have been ascribed the state-of-mind of a
pure maximiser. Rousseau’s Crusoe escaped its author’s censure because his retreat into solitude
left him no-one else to please other than himself, Campe attempted to construct a Crusoe that
was a ﬂawless personiﬁcation of such an escape, and it was this that caught Gossen’s eye when he
began his search for a suitable ﬁgure to act as his homo economicus.
The question that must be asked for my analysis, then, is which of these two forms of virtue
Defoe’s version of Crusoe more obviously manifests on his island. Is it the virtue born of a well-
mannered engagement with bourgeois politeness or the virtue to be found in the embrace of a
purely solitary state? Does it therefore involve the cycle of fall and redemption as described by
literary scholars of Defoe’s work or as described by Rousseau? The prospect of identifying a dis-
tinctively Rousseauian Crusoe myth that populates Émile depends on whether Defoe’s Crusoe ever
genuinely comes to terms with pre-social forms of self-realisation that being cast away makes
possible.
Crusoe’s problematic relationship with solitude
Defoe required Crusoe to pay seemingly obsessive attention to domesticating his island. This was
evidently something very different to Émile’s lessons in botany or the real-life Emiliuses’ in tending
their garden plots. It is noticeable just how hard he works himself during his time alone, far too hard
to invoke the idea of the desert island as an idyllic natural setting (Rogers 1979, p. 54). His domes-
tication strategy is explicitly one of domination, enshrining a procedural ethic through which
JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 87
anything or anyone coming into contact with the island immediately becomes his property. He has a
freedom to own on the island which appears markedly more important to him than the freedom he
also has to enjoy the island as an unspoilt natural landscape.
As Defoe allowed but Rousseau and Campe did not, Crusoe is cast away complete with the embo-
died labour of capital goods that he and his dead shipmates were carrying on their doomed voyage.
He therefore does not start his island sojourn with nothing, as would be the implication of taking
Rousseau’s principles of natural education as the point of entry, but is accompanied by useful rem-
nants of his prior society. These goods are put to use specifically in acquisitive projects designed to
enhance the value of his property. As Watt (1974, pp. 87, 88) suggests, ‘Defoe’s hero is not really a
primitive nor a proletarian but a capitalist… [H]is solitude is the measure, and the price of his luck’
for having no competitors when asserting his property rights. Crusoe makes concerted attempts to
exemplify his ability to own exclusively by fencing off his land, even though this stands in marked
contrast to the contemporary accounts of the actions of marooned men on which Defoe could have
drawn (White 1982, p. 37). Not one of them recounts expending labour on creating enclosures as a
permanent reminder of property entitlement that might be issued to presumably only ever imagined
others. Manuel Schonhorn (1991, pp. 144, 155–156) consequently associates Crusoe’s efforts to
enclose as much of the island as possible with Defoe’s endorsement of an absolutist conception of
property, whereby the first person in a state of nature to make a claim on a particular piece of
land subsequently owns it fully and unconditionally.
Much can be said in this regard about how unlike the Rousseauian ideal the resulting situation is
and how far Rousseau had to go in rewriting Defoe’s original story to appropriate the Crusoe name
for his own purposes. Perhaps most obviously, in the Discourse on Inequality Rousseau identified the
first seizure of previously commonly-held land as the originating moment of humankind’s descent
into socialised forms of existence (Charvet 1974, pp. 24–25). It is, in effect, the moment at which the
natural self is forever lost to a past to which Émile cannot return. ‘The first man’, he wrote, ‘who,
having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying “This is mine”, and found people
simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society’ (Rousseau [1754] 1993, p. 84).
In his historicisation of human nature it is the property-owning individual who was the first to
become mindful of displaying the fruits of industriousness as a means of social comparison:
‘[T]here arose rivalry and competition [… as…] the first effects of property’ (Rousseau [1754]
1993, p. 96). Crusoe breathes life into such effects by turning what had once been a pristine landscape
into land that serves the accumulation function (Curkpatrick 2002, pp. 258–259). This good husban-
dry is celebrated by the Defoe scholar Maximillian Novak (1962, pp. 57–58) as evidence of the repli-
cation under trying circumstances of the ‘civilised society’, but this is a condition that Rousseau
repeatedly denounced so that the individual might instead live a self-contained and self-sustaining
life. It is clear that Campe’s Crusoe also went in for husbandry in a way that was mirrored in his
pupils being given their own personal garden. Even an avowedly Rousseauian educational exper-
iment therefore let the accompanying Crusoe figure keep some of the behavioural characteristics
that Defoe gave him but that Rousseau wanted to take away. Finding the right balance between
nature and society, either for the abstract Émile or the real-life Emiliuses, was therefore far from
an assured affair.
Furthermore, the labour that Defoe’s Crusoe undertakes during his period as a castaway appears
to provide him with a mechanism for whiling away his time in preference to having to reflect on the
implications of solitude (Richetti 2001, p. xxiii). Admittedly, he does utter a few brave but isolated
words about the restorative capacity of the time he spends alone when trying to come to terms with
the error of his previous ways: ‘It was now that I began sensibly to feel howmuch more happy this life
I now led was, with all its miserable circumstances, than the wicked, cursed, abominable life I led all
the past part of my days’ (p. 125); ‘in my silent state of life in the island… I wanted nothing but what
I had, and had nothing but what I wanted’ (p. 281). Scratching the surface of these thoughts, how-
ever, makes it clear that the relevant passages are only incidentally about solitude itself. Their driving
force is his gratitude for not having gone the same way as his shipmates: ‘I believe it is impossible to
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express to the life what the extasies and transports of the soul are, when it is so saved, as I may say,
out of the very grave’ (p. 65);
With these reflections I worked mymind up, not only to resignation to the will of God in the present disposition
of my circumstances, but even to a sincere thankfulness for my condition, and that I, who was yet a living man,
ought not to complain, seeing I had not the due punishment of my sins. (pp. 142–143)
The defining theme of Defoe’s Crusoe’s thoughts about being on his own therefore has little – and
perhaps even nothing – to do with the condition of solitude per se. Instead it is intimately bound to
his attempts both to construct a providential account of how he came to be cast away and to convince
himself that Providence was justified in dispatching the fateful storm. The premise of just punish-
ment coheres in his mind as the thought that he has been placed on the island to repent for his
prior lifestyle and to reconstitute his economic subjectivity accordingly (p. 107). The new forms
of self-discipline that Crusoe learns when alone are almost all directed at accommodating himself
to the prospect of leading a solid if unspectacular life of middle-class sobriety when he returns
home. He understands his success in domesticating the island to be a reflection of how far he has
come in domesticating himself to that end.
The domination he exercises over the natural landscape consequently has a direct analogue in the
domination he exercises over his own outlook on life. Both would appear to be open contradictions
of Rousseau’s own stated ideals. Defoe’s Crusoe performs psychological restrictions on himself to
ensure that he emerges from the island more in tune with the social norms of early eighteenth-cen-
tury England than he was when he arrived. This is an entirely alien state-of-being for what eventually
emerged in Gossen’s work as the neoclassical homo economicus, who serves his purpose for econ-
omic theory precisely to the extent to which he is unaffected by any social norm whatsoever. This
particular Crusoe figure, the isolated economising individual, can have no thought for how well
he conforms to prevailing social norms, otherwise he would be forced to give up both his isolation
and his status as an economiser. The psychological restrictions that Defoe’s Crusoe enacts upon him-
self are facilitated by his solitary confinement. That, after all, is the whole point of giving the story a
desert island setting. At no stage in his personal renewal, though, does he find the process of
embodying his new character traits either easy or pleasurable. It is specifically bourgeois virtue he
tries to instil in himself, not Rousseau’s virtue in solitude that subsequently facilitates, via a circuitous
route involving Basedow, Campe and Gossen, the wholly desocialised depiction of the neoclassical
homo economicus. Indeed, Defoe’s Crusoe must find a way of ending his solitude if he is to demon-
strate to his own satisfaction the success of his conversion to the distinctive pattern of social manners
in operation in early eighteenth-century England.
Completely consistently with Rousseau’s critique of socialised forms of existence, the more that
Crusoe manages to turn the island from something inhospitably alien to something familiar from his
previous life the more he wishes to see others marvel at his material accomplishments. He had always
craved company, but the content of his craving changes markedly as he learns over time to become a
‘compleat natural mechanick’ (p. 89) who increasingly excels at making goods that he can imagine
having a defined monetary worth. Where once he wished for companions to help him conduct his
labour more effectively, increasingly he hopes for the presence of others to pass positive judgement
on how well he has done for himself to be surrounded by so much property and so many possessions
(pp. 192–193). For economists today, whether textbook writers or the theorists who provide the text-
book writers with their base material, the most essential feature of the Crusoe construction continues
to be that he is always ‘doing the best he can’ (Nechyba 2011, p. 546). However, there is a subtle
development of meaning in operation here. Defoe’s Crusoe does not attempt to transcend the social
construction of eighteenth-century economic man so much as make great efforts to embody its most
essential characteristics. He wants people to see how well he has done for himself, but only within
that specific frame of reference. The marginalist originators of the neoclassical homo economicus,
by contrast, believed that they had deprived him of all historically bound social constructions of
economic man by mimicking the wholeness that Rousseau had first attributed to the natural self
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and later set as a goal for Émile. This enables him to do the best he can in a much more fundamen-
tally self-enclosed sense.
Defoe’s Crusoe, however, becomes the epitome of Rousseau’s fallen humanity, attempting to live
in the opinion of others even when there are no others physically present to hold a favourable
opinion of him. Even his providentialist account of the fateful storm through which he was cast
away serves two purposes. It means most obviously that he can rationalise the need to become
the man of good bourgeois character as an act of atonement for past economic indiscretions (Rogers
1979, p. 52). More subtly, it also creates an authority figure in his mind from whom he can seek
endorsement of the ongoing reconstruction of his economic subjectivity. By secularising his vision
of an unseen deity, Crusoe is able to prepare himself for an untroubled return home (p. 146). What
he needs to do to impress God with his attempts at spiritual redemption through hard work simul-
taneously corresponds to what he will need to do to fit inconspicuously into the prevailing bourgeois
order back in England. Rousseau’s Crusoe, which eventually evolved into Gossen’s, exhibits none of
these thoughts, because he bears the influence of neither a theological moral nor the celebration of
middle-class civility. Despite both Campe’s and Gossen’s personal deference to the religious norms
of their day, the Crusoe figure that Gossen created for economic theory from Campe’s is sufficiently
abstract to deny the influence of all cultural promptings.
Interestingly, even Defoe’s Crusoe ends all pretence to a truly providential reading of his circum-
stances at the first moment company arrives (p. 269). This is also exactly the same moment as the
prosperity that he works so hard to build through cultivating his land suddenly becomes socially sig-
nificant. And it is also when Rousseau ([1762] 2003, p. 163) insisted that he ceased to be of interest to
Émile and when Gossen ([1854] 1983, p. 54) insisted that he ceased to be of interest to economic
theory. For Defoe’s Crusoe, learning to be conditioned by the economic norms of early eight-
eenth-century English society means learning to commit himself to accepting other people’s assess-
ments of the mark he has left upon the world. In the absence of company during his time alone on
the island there are no human others in whose opinions he could attempt to live. Instead he creates
for himself a God to whom he talks in human form (p. 146). He tries temporarily to live within the
opinions of this God, albeit only to generate vicariously what in reality is secularly derived approval
for having aligned his labour to the demands of middle-class domesticity. Insofar as he flirts with a
real spiritual conversion at all this appears only ever to be a front for his economic conversion to a
lifestyle that Rousseau ([1754] 1993, p. 109, [1762] 2003, p. 186) dismissed on purely philosophical
grounds and tried his best in practical terms to shelter Émile from.
Defoe’s Crusoe’s instrumental appropriation of religion should therefore be understood as evi-
dence of his failure to come to terms with the possibility, to use Rousseauian language, of ‘living
within himself’ (Shinagel 1968, pp. 128–129). Albeit in different ways, for different reasons and
guided by different motivations, the neoclassical homo economicus operates on this Rousseauian
plane, but Defoe’s Crusoe does not. Not once does he prepare himself for exiting the mindset appro-
priate to socialised forms of existence, even when he is physically deprived of society. Every aspect of
Crusoe’s time alone on the island is haunted by a deep ambivalence about the possibility of being
forced psychologically into himself (Sill 1983, p. 161). He makes no attempt to render himself
whole again in the manner of Rousseau’s depiction of a life lived solely in accordance with the pre-
cepts of a purely natural education.
Crusoe’s imaginative reconstruction of subjects
Defoe’s Crusoe’s solitary state during his time alone means that he experiences company at that time
only ever vicariously. People’s opinions come to him via mental practices of imaginative reconstruc-
tion. Rousseau’s perspective on the imagination in general was critical – ‘abstractions [of the mind]
are painful and unnatural operations’ (Rousseau [1754] 1993, p. 67) – and he became increasingly
entrenched in his criticism the more that the imagination was occupied solely with normalising
socialised forms of existence. He first announced his suspicion that humankind’s fall from the
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natural state was linked to imaginative acts in the opening passages of the Discourse on the Moral
Effects of the Arts and Sciences. There, he described the needs of the mind as the ‘ornaments’ of
society (Rousseau [1750] 1993, p. 4), the accomplishment of mental tasks serving initially to establish
and then to reproduce the norms that elicit socialised behaviour. Governed by the realm of the
imagination, ‘We no longer dare seem what we really are but lie under a perpetual restraint’ (Rous-
seau [1750] 1993, p. 6). In his Letter to d’Alembert he described that restraint specifically as ‘the
empire of opinion’ (Rousseau [1758] 1968, p. 22). Rousseau reduced the actions of modern economic
man to the promptings of an imagination that is limited in its scope of possibility by the prevailing
system of manners (Ryn 1997, p. 43). The desire to attain objectives that first enter the consciousness
as aspirational devices arises only through the way in which contact with others establishes hierar-
chies of possessive individualism in the mind (Scott 1992, p. 702). In Benjamin Barber’s (1978, p. 82)
words, ‘Rousseau seems to reconstruct a classic ascetic case against [the imagination]’.
The one imagination that appears to be exempt from such pressures is Rousseau’s own. According
to his autobiographical work, this is because he successfully tutored himself to isolation and conse-
quently deprived his imagination of the corrupting influences of socialised forms of existence (You-
sef 2001, p. 262). Interestingly, though, the practices he described in The Dialogues situate him
physically but not psychologically in isolation. The solitude that he willingly enforced upon himself
was designed specifically to allow him ‘to bring together the sweetness of study and the charms of
intimacy’ (Rousseau [1782] 1990, p. 14). That is, he used his time alone in an attempt to understand
more about himself through the hypothetical reconstruction of his relationships with his closest
friends. As he himself put it, ‘I fostered [such thoughts] in an ideal world which my creative imagin-
ation soon peopled with beings after my own heart’ (Rousseau [1782] 1953, p. 398). The choice of
imaginative companions is significant, because in Rousseau’s schema a thoroughgoing egalitarianism
structures the relationship between close friends. Social conventions do not interpose into the way in
which such people relate to one another, restoring to them a wholeness that does not have to be sacri-
ficed to the simulation and pretence of society (Barber 1978, p. 85).
However, the original Crusoe’s imaginative reconstruction of company could hardly have been
more different. Defoe failed to place in Crusoe’s imagination friends to whom he can issue love,
so much as temporary acquaintances whom he has no desire at all to know well (Grapard 1995,
p. 33). It is arguably the defining feature of the neoclassical homo economicus that he has nobody
other than himself to call to mind, imaginatively reconstruct and vicariously relate to. Insofar as
Rousseau’s Crusoe might be expected to follow Rousseau himself if he is to be the perfect role
model for Émile, then he must use the imagination to engage at least his close friends. There are cer-
tainly plenty of hints that Campe’s Crusoe does so. Neither, therefore, is the neoclassical homo eco-
nomicus in his own right. Defoe’s Crusoe, perhaps unsurprisingly given what has already been said,
also remains a resolutely imperfect template for the neoclassical homo economicus, because he is
sure that temporary acquaintances are socially meaningful to him at the moments at which they
impinge upon his stock of property in some way. However, the extra characters that Defoe intro-
duced to his text so that he could write parables of property ownership only enter Crusoe’s con-
sciousness as either the purveyor of things or the judge of their social value once these things are
physically in his possession.
Defoe’s Crusoe takes such a perspective to its logical extreme in treating anyone he encounters in
the same way as material goods by objectifying them and rendering them suitable for subordination.
He does not relate to people through the pure human wholeness that Rousseau ([1782] 1953, pp. 212,
395) wrote about approvingly when describing the egalitarian relationship he enjoyed with his
friends. This is the same human wholeness that he believed Émile could learn from his version of
Crusoe. Instead, Defoe’s Crusoe uses contractual obligations where the main aim is to enable him
to dominate. This might explain why his mind appears to attach itself much more expediently to
the idea of saving Europeans than non-Europeans (pp. 177–179, 212–213, 233). He recognises
specifically in Europeans the likelihood that they will abide by the same standards of contractual
obligation as he does (Hymer 1971, pp. 31–32). These are people who away from the island
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would be his equals in the face of the law, but who on the island will be culturally disposed to treat his
antecedent claims to property ownership as the law (Grapard 1995, pp. 42–43). Even the captain of
the ship that eventually restores Crusoe to his own society is required to submit himself to the pol-
itical structure of legitimacy transposed from that society in order to respect the procedural ethics of
Crusoe’s right to property on the island (pp. 253–254). The use of contractual obligation to deter-
mine the content of personal relations thereby becomes a means through which he establishes his
dominion over the entire lifeworld associated with the island, whether inanimate or animate,
non-human or human.
In all of this Crusoe’s imagination departs from Rousseau’s by calling up representations of sub-
jects rather than of friends. Crusoe’s instinct is always to narrate his relationship to others in terms of
hierarchies that he stands atop, enacting quasi-regal prerogatives to be followed by subordinates: ‘my
people were perfectly subjected: I was absolute lord and lawgiver’ (p. 241). As Schonhorn (1991,
p. 152) notes, his ‘rhetoric of absolutism and submission, of kingly authority and subject obedience,
places the right and might of sovereignty in the office of the monarch’. The irony is completely lost
on Crusoe that in expecting such a high level of compliance to a social order that he has established
by convention he requires much more of other people than he was willing to countenance of himself
as a younger man.
His political conversion to the idea of an established order begins when fantasising that his meal
times in the company of his parrot, dog and two cats represent a social hierarchy with him at its apex:
‘see how like a king I dined… all alone, attended by my servants’ (p. 157). This follows his decision,
in his sixth year cast away, to set off in his hand-made canoe to sail around the island as a means of
familiarising himself with the thought of property ownership. The decision is justified by his ‘being
eager to view the circumference of my little kingdom’ (p. 147). Tellingly, this is when he initially
begins to describe his time on the island as ‘my reign’ (p. 147): ‘if I pleased, I might call my self
king… over the whole country which I had possession of. There were no rivals; I had no competitor,
none to dispute sovereignty or command with me’ (p. 139). The Defoe scholar J.R. Hammond (2001,
p. 74) has gone as far as to suggest that Robinson Crusoe can consequently ‘be regarded as a “god
game” romance, a genre in which a masterful figure on an island assumes the attributes of a divinity’.
It is clear from this that the conception of sovereignty underpinning the novel’s narrative struc-
ture operates simultaneously at two distinct levels. Defoe’s Crusoe’s articulation of Puritan piety –
however instrumental it might be deemed – places him under the control of providential sovereignty
(Starr 1976, p. 91). Yet the manner in which he claims property rights over the land on which he is set
down to ostensibly do God’s will allows him to act upon an exclusive sovereignty with respect to the
island’s lifeworld (Novak 1962, pp. 62–63). Providential and imperialistic sovereignty thereby co-
exist, with Crusoe seeking the approbation of God for involving himself throughout the text in
the expropriation of the island’s natural landscape for imperialistic purposes (Engélibert 1996,
p. 269). The presumed legitimacy of such power is thus the ideological superstructure which main-
tains the unequal relationships that he constructs to his own advantage.
For Rousseau ([1754] 1993, p. 85), the identification of power as a resource to be used self-inter-
estedly represents a significant moment in his historicisation of the distance that humankind has tra-
velled from the natural self. He argued that there are specific living conditions unique to socialised
forms of existence that have to be in place for the concept of power to become meaningful as an
aspect of individual consciousness. For anyone to exhibit patterns of behaviour consistent with
the desire to incorporate anyone else into an effective dominion,
he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of the rest of the world; who can be
made happy and satisfied with themselves rather on the testimony of other people than on their own. (Rousseau
[1754] 1993, p. 116)
He associated the quest for power unequivocally with ‘this unremitting rage of distinguishing our-
selves’ (Rousseau [1754] 1993, p. 112). Everything once again relates back to the imaginative leaps
that the natural self cannot make because of the absence of the comparative reference point arising
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from self-awareness. Only individuals experiencing the fall into socialised forms of existence know
what it is to think of themselves in situations in which they might be advantaged by subordinating
other people’s interests.
Individuals seek superiority in a Rousseauian world because they compete for the esteem that
constitutes external ratification of their social standing (McLendon 2003, pp. 121–122). Defoe’s Cru-
soe proves that he is not Rousseau’s Crusoe by doing this in the imagination in the first place so that
he can construct for himself a regal personality that he increasingly comes to internalise. Once man-
ifested in this way it can subsequently be used in earnest to determine the content of his relationships
when he is no longer alone on the island. The feeling of additional self-worth he derives from ima-
ginatively depicting himself in positions of power translates latterly into attempts to acquire subjects
as a means of enhancing his perceived self-worth still further (pp. 157, 207–209, 218–221). Crusoe’s
constant attention to domesticating his land is inexplicable in its own terms, as its intrinsic economic
worth to him is exhausted the moment it meets his subsistence needs. Rousseau’s Crusoe, the bota-
nist who acts as Émile’s guide to nature, will not work beyond the point of making the land sustain
him. The actions of Defoe’s Crusoe only become easier to understand when considering how, from
the perspective of early eighteenth-century economic man, the implicit value of property serves as a
direct proxy for the esteem that can be generated from owning it. He is therefore definitively both a
socially constructed economic man, the like of which the early marginalists tried to write out of econ-
omic theory, and the specific socially constructed economic man against whom Rousseau offered his
principles of natural education as an alternative normative ideal-type.
It is therefore necessary to think more deeply about how the Crusoe figure that Rousseau refash-
ioned to his own ends in Émile latterly re-emerged as another rather different Crusoe figure that the
neoclassical economists made serve as their homo economicus. Ridding Crusoe of the specific social
artefacts of Defoe’s time and place was the first step in turning him into the blank canvas of a
thoroughly desocialised individual. It was by no means preordained, though, that this would lead
to Crusoe having the features of the neoclassical homo economicus latterly painted onto him. How-
ever, every journey must start somewhere, and Crusoe’s journey out of the pages of literature and
into those of theoretical books on economic principles begins here, with Rousseau. The next steps
involved Basedow’s founding of a progressive school in Eastern Germany on Rousseauian principles,
and his successor Campe’s systematic rewriting of Robinson Crusoe in an attempt to provide his
pupils with what he thought was an even better role model for a natural education than Rousseau
had managed. The final steps were taken when Gossen seized upon Campe’s Crusoe figure to illus-
trate his very early marginalist theory of value and when what conventionally are still seen as the
first-generation marginalists subsequently reconciled their abstract economising agent to Gossen’s
trailblazing theory of value. The marginalists of the early 1870s were unaware of Gossen’s prior
work when setting out their own analytical frameworks, but they soon accepted Gossen’s right to
precedence upon the publication of the first history of marginalism, which appeared in 1879 in
the second edition of Stanley Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy (see Jevons [1871/1911] 2013,
pp. liii–lx). Each of these moves towards the neoclassical homo economicus required, in its own
terms, something of a leap in the dark. None was necessarily suggested by what had gone before.
Yet each would have been highly unlikely to have taken the form by which we now know it had
the preceding stages not occurred as they did. There is thus still much to gain from examining closely
Rousseau’s Crusoe myth because of what came after it.
Conclusion
Rousseau remarked in his autobiographical writings that he stood outside of society most obviously
in his rejection of contrived appearance and his commitment to providing a truthful representation
of himself (Rousseau [1782] 1953, p. 17). The propensity for inauthenticity, he argued, is indicative
of the extent of humankind’s fall from the natural state (Rousseau [1750] 1993, p. 5, [1754] 1993,
pp. 81–82, 88). In this respect it is something of a puzzle that he was prepared to present Émile, a
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boy whose natural education was to be conducted in line with his principles of life, with an egregious
Crusoe myth (Rousseau [1762] 2003, pp. 163–165). The romanticised story of a socially-abstracted
Crusoe acting in accordance with what nature allows is impossible to reconstruct from Defoe’s text.
But it is this that Rousseau fully committed himself to.
Rousseau is clearly culpable for this mischaracterisation of Crusoe as an effective approximation
of how far his theory of a natural education could take an individual along the path to the natural self.
Yet he is entirely blameless for the way in which his mischaracterisation has passed through several
subsequent hands to re-emerge as the basis for the neoclassical homo economicus. It too trades on
the instinctive association that the Crusoe name triggers to a back-to-nature survivalism. Most of us
will recall from our childhoods retellings of the Crusoe story that take this form, and it is all-too-easy
to substitute these re-workings for what is actually to be found in Defoe’s original text. They become
what the memory says is ‘known’, and it is not far from this understanding of Crusoe’s efforts to do
his best in the struggle against nature to the basic outline of the neoclassical homo economicus.
There is a cultural suggestibility in operation here – Crusoe becomes the neoclassical homo econom-
icus because that is what we want to believe he is – but it has only inadvertent roots in Rousseau’s
work. He was merely the first to impose upon Crusoe the attributes of a desocialised agent, an ideal-
ised and potentially transcontextual ‘economic man’, that the early marginalists found so convenient
for their theory.
Reading backwards from the 1870s, the marginalist pioneers Jevons and Menger were surprised to
discover that their Crusoe figure was not, strictly-speaking, their own, because Gossen had pre-
empted them by almost twenty years in illustrating marginalist principles via a Crusoe figure.
Even then, though, Gossen’s Crusoe figure was not, strictly-speaking, Defoe’s, because he referenced
Campe’s imitation and not Defoe’s original. Campe’s Robinson der Jüngere was part of his broader
pedagogical writings that, following Basedow, experimented with putting into practice the principles
of a natural education that Rousseau outlined in Émile. But even then there were definite departures
from what Rousseau had presented as the ideal. Nothing is as it seems at first glance, then, in the
historiographical back-story to how the Crusoe figure has come to stand in for the neoclassical
homo economicus. That back-story in itself plays no part in the economics textbooks’ presentation
of the neoclassical homo economicus, notwithstanding the times at which this presentation directly
references the so-called Robinson Crusoe Economy (Hewitson 1999, p. 111). A Crusoe figure none-
theless remains intensely important to the cultural precepts on which the modern economy is
founded. Economic theory is a crucial source of authority for the inculcation of behaviour consistent
with the neoclassical homo economicus, and it is still a Crusoe figure that is most readily brought to
mind whenever attention turns to naming someone who might pass muster as the neoclassical homo
economicus.
It is genuinely perplexing just how many jumps are necessary to get from Defoe’s original novel to
the cultural significance of today’s economics textbooks. The neoclassical homo economicus is now
pushed often really rather aggressively as a cultural project, but it is difficult to conclude anything
other than he was created by accident. At the very least, he relies for his believability on a particular
variant of the Crusoe figure who has a most unlikely provenance. Rousseau ([1754] 1993, p. 73),
arch-critic of the modern economy’s encouragement of ‘purely relative and factitious feeling’, appro-
priated Defoe’s Crusoe figure and turned him from everything that he found so contemptible about
socialised forms of existence into a role model for a ‘natural’ lifestyle that celebrated the radical
autonomy that the individual gains when opting out of society. The early marginalists subsequently
appropriated Rousseau’s Crusoe figure, albeit only after it had passed through the hands of Basedow,
Campe and Gossen, so that a named desocialised economic agent could be used to exemplify the
maximisation properties of pure economic theory. This is a haphazard and entirely unplanned
route to homo economicus’s current status as a cultural icon. The flimsiness of the links through
which he has been brought to life is well worth bearing in mind next time one feels the social pressure
to be like homo economicus.
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Notes
1. I am extremely grateful to the journal’s two anonymous referees, who have helped me enormously to clarify my
argument and to make sure that it is as robust and as error-free as possible. They have alerted me to the need to
remove a number of weaknesses from it, and if they are convinced that some weaknesses remain then that is, of
course, solely my fault and not theirs.
2. All of the references to the text of Robinson Crusoe take this form and they relate to Defoe ([1719] 1985) listed in
the bibliography.
3. This is typically translated into English as Proposal to Philanthropists and Men of Means Regarding Schools and
Studies.
4. Robinson der Jüngere translates directly from the German as Robinson the Younger. However, Campe’s book
entered the English language from his French translation that he published as Le Nouveau Robinson, and
for this reason it is usually translated into English as The New Robinson.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This article was written with financial assistance from an Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Fellow-
ship. The Fellowship [grant number ES/K010697/1] supports the project, ‘Rethinking the Market’ (http://www.
warwick.ac.uk/rethinkingthemarket). I gratefully acknowledge the ESRC’s ongoing support of my research.
Notes on contributor
MatthewWatson is Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the Uni-
versity of Warwick. He is also currently a UK Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Fellow.
References
BAGGERMAN, A. & DEKKER, R. (2009) Child of the Enlightenment: Revolutionary Europe Reflected in a Boyhood Diary,
translated by D. Webb, Brill, Leiden.
BANERJEE, A. (1977) ‘Rousseau’s concept of theatre’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 171–177.
BARBER, B. (1978) ‘Rousseau and the paradoxes of the dramatic imagination’, Daedalus, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 79–92.
BILLIG, V. (2014) ‘“I”-lands: the construction and shipwreck of an insular figure in modern discourse’, in Shipwreck and
Island Motifs in Literature and the Arts, eds B. Le Juez & O. Springer, Brill, Leiden, pp. 17–32.
BOWEN, J. (1981) A History of Western Education, Volume III: The Modern West Europe and the NewWorld, Routledge,
London.
CAMPE, J. H. (1788) The New Robinson Crusoe, Stockdale, London.
CHARVET, J. (1974) The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
CURKPATRICK, S. (2002) ‘The Footprint in the Sand: providence, invention, and alterity in Robinson Crusoe’, Pacifica, vol.
15, no. 3, pp. 247–265.
DAMROSCH, L. (1985) God’s Plot and Man’s Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from Milton to Fielding,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
DEFOE, D. ([1719] 1985) Robinson Crusoe, edited by A. Ross, Penguin, London.
ENGÉLIBERT, J.-P. (1996) ‘Daniel Defoe as character: subversion of the myths of Robinson Crusoe and of the author’, in
Robinson Crusoe: Myths and Metamorphoses, ed. L. Spaas and B. Stimpson, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 267–281.
FISHELOV, D. (2010) Dialogues with/and Great Books: The Dynamics of Canon Formation, Sussex Academic Press,
Brighton.
FUCHS, E. (2004) ‘Nature and Bildung: pedagogical naturalism in nineteenth-century Germany’, in The Moral Authority
of Nature, eds L. Daston and F. Vidal, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 155–181.
GOSSEN, H. H. ([1854] 1983) The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom, translated
by R. Blitz, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
GRAPARD, U. (1995) ‘Robinson Crusoe: the quintessential economic man?’, Feminist Economics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 33–52.
GREEN, M. (1991) Seven Types of Adventure Tale: An Etiology of a Major Genre, Penn State Press, University Park, PA.
HAMMOND, J. R. (2001) A Defoe Companion, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
HARARI, J. (1987) Scenarios of the Imaginary: Theorizing the French Enlightenment, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 95
HEWITSON, G. (1999) ‘Robinson Crusoe: the paradigmatic “rational economic man”’, in Robinson Crusoe’s Economic
Man: A Construction and Deconstruction, eds U. Grapard and G. Hewitson, Routledge, London, pp. 111–132.
HUNTER, J. P. (1966) The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe’s Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe, Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MA.
HYMER, S. (1971) ‘Robinson Crusoe and the secret of primitive accumulation’,Monthly Review, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 11–36.
IDELSON-SHEIN, I. (2014) Difference of a Different Kind: Jewish Constructions of Race during the Long Eighteenth Century,
University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, PA.
JEVONS, W. S. ([1871/1911] 2013) The Theory of Political Economy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
KUHN, B. (2006) ‘“A chain of marvels”: botany and autobiography in Rousseau’, European Romantic Review, vol. 17, no.
1, pp. 1–20.
LOUDEN, R. (2011) Kant’s Human Being: Essays on his Theory of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
MCGRATH, B. (2010) ‘Rousseau’s Crusoe: or, on learning to read as not myself’, Eighteenth-Century Fiction, vol. 23, no. 1,
pp. 119–139.
MCLENDON, M. L. (2003) ‘The overvaluation of talent: an interpretation and application of Rousseau’s amour-propre’,
Polity, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 115–138.
MENGER, C. ([1871] 1950) Principles of Economics, translated by J. Dingwall and B. Hoselitz, Ludwig von Mises Institute,
Auburn, AL.
NECHYBA, T. (2011)Microeconomics: An Intuitive Approach with Calculus, international edition, Cengage, Boston, MA.
NOVAK, M. (1962) Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
RICHETTI, J. (2001) ‘Introduction’, in Robinson Crusoe, by D. Defoe, Penguin, London, pp. ix–xxviii.
ROGERS, P. (1979) Robinson Crusoe, George Allen and Unwin, London.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1782] 1953) The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated by J.M. Cohen, Penguin, London.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1758] 1968) Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theater, translated by A. Bloom,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1782] 1990) Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques, Dialogues, translated by R. Masters, C. Kelly and J. Bush,
University Press of New England, Dartmouth, MA.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1750] 1993) ‘A discourse on the moral effects of the arts and sciences’, in The Social Contract and
Discourses, ed. J.-J. Rousseau, translated by G.D.H. Cole, Everyman, London, pp. 1–29.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1754] 1993) ‘A discourse on the origin of inequality’, in The Social Contract and Discourses, ed. J.-J.
Rousseau, translated by G.D.H. Cole, Everyman, London, pp. 31–126.
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. ([1762] 2003) Émile, or Treatise on Education, translated by W. H. Payne, Prometheus Books, Amherst,
NY.
RYN, C. (1997) ‘Imaginative origins of modernity: life as daydream and nightmare’,Humanitas, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 41–60.
SCHONHORN, M. (1991) Defoe’s Politics: Parliament, Power, Kingship, and Robinson Crusoe, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
SCOTT, J. (1992) ‘The theodicy of the Second Discourse: the “pure state of nature” and Rousseau’s political thought’,
American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 696–711.
SHARMA, P. (2007) Education Administration, A.P.H. Publishing, New Delhi.
SHINAGEL, M. (1968) Daniel Defoe and Middle-Class Gentility, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
SILL, G. (1983) Defoe and the Idea of Fiction, 1713–1719, Associated University Presses, London.
STARR, G. (1976) ‘Robinson Crusoe’s conversion’, in Daniel Defoe: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. M. Byrd, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, pp. 78–91.
VANPÉE, J. (1990) ‘Lessons in Rousseau’s Emile ou de l’education’, Modern Language Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 40–49.
WATT, I. (1951) ‘Robinson Crusoe as a myth’, Essays in Criticism, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 95–119.
WATT, I. (1974) The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding, Chatto and Windus, London.
WHITE, M. (1982) ‘Reading and rewriting: the production of an economic Robinson Crusoe’, in Robinson Crusoe’s
Economic Man: A Construction and Deconstruction, eds U. Grapard and G. Hewitson, Routledge, London, pp.
15–41.
WHITE, M. (1998) ‘Robinson Crusoe’, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Volume 4, eds J. Eatwell, M.
Milgate and P. Newman, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 217–218.
YOUSEF, N. (2001) ‘Savage or solitary? The wild child and Rousseau’s man of nature’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol.
62, no. 2, pp. 245–263.
96 M. WATSON
